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Reviews
In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of
Canada. By Paul Weiler. Toronto: Carswell/Methuen. 1974.
Pp. xv, 246. Price: $12.95.
Paul Weiler has given us a book which can help end the sterile
debate between the analytical school and those who advocate a
policy-oriented approach to legal analysis. Weiler demonstrates that
each of these groups is making a valid claim on our legal system in
terms of the common law tradition, and that an appropriate style of
legal reasoning in the Supreme Court of Canada requires a blending
of legal policy and doctrinal analysis.
The interesting thing to discover is that the style of reasoning
urged by Weiler looks like the tradition of the common law at its
best, as seen in the "grand tradition" of the nineteenth century in
England, and now revived in the landmark public law decisions of
the House of Lords and Privy Council of the past decade: Ridge v.
Baldwin, 1 Conway v. Rimmer, 2 Padfield v. Minister of Agricul-
ture, 3 Anisminic, 4 Liyanage v. The Queen, 5 and, to the delight of
this reviewer, in the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Thorson v. A-G Canada,6 now the leading case on
standing to challenge the validy of legislation in Canada.
The key to a vital and creative common law system, in Weiler's
analysis, lies in an understanding of the relationship between rules
and principles. A rule is a specific formulation, designed for
operation within a technical framework of analysis to provide
solutions to concrete disputes. Rules link the general to the
particular. A principle is a more general expression of a value or of
a balancing of competing values. One gets a sense of what the law is
trying to accomplish from an articulated principle, whereas a rule
tends to assume that the process of inquiring into and balancing
competing interests has ended. We apply the rule, confident that its
authority flows from the fact that the best accommodation possible
1. [1964]A.C. 40.
2. [1968]A.C. 910.
3. [1968]2 WLR 924.
4. Anisminic Co. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 WLR 163.
5. [1967] A.C. 259.
6. [1974143 DLR (3d) 1.
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has been arrived at. But if we have any sense of history we also
re-examine rules from time to time to ensure that changing
circumstances or misinterpretation have not diminished their
usefulness or rendered them counter-productive. Since any given
rule is unlikely to receive the attention of the highest court in the
land very often, it seems reasonable to suggest, as Weiler does, that
the Supreme Court concern itself continuously with the underlying
principles that support the rules found in precedent.
This is what Weiler is driving at when he urges a shift in style of
reasoning. He argues, with ample justification, that the Supreme
Court's recent style involves too much of a search for the key words
or phrases in a precedent, for the ratio decidendi, as if rigorous
analysis of the written word will eventually lead to the "true rule"
for the case before the Court. This approach is the direct
consequence of a mental set that sees the law as a great mass of
rules, found in precedents, capable of infinite shades of meaning,
one for every conceivable set of facts. Weiler's central theme is that
the appellate function requires a different mental set, one which
views the law as a coherent body of principles whose purpose is to
balance and accommodate competing and complementary interests.
Certainty in the law is but one of the major interests involved. One
cannot build a sound legal order on certainty alone.
I would add that while it is essential that appellate courts express
their decisions in terms of principles, trial courts too must perceive
rules as particular expressions of principles if they are to apply
soundly the law laid down by appellate courts.
Because of the book's great potential as a basis for dialogue in the
legal profession, it is important that Weiler's thesis not be
misunderstood. It is especially vital to guard against the common
misconception of what is meant by the word "policy" when used
by a responsible legal scholar. The following is a key passage in the
necessary clarification:
It is a basic feature of an appellate process that the judges write a
reasoned opinion justifying their legal conclusions. We can now see
how much more complicated this reasoning is than the layman's view of
what is involved in the easy cases. To be sure, courts are supposed to
adjudicate the concrete cases before them by fitting them within the
legal system. Important legal values such as predictability, efficiency,
and impersonality support this demand for judicial adherence to the
established law. Yet the dictates of this law are not unambiguous in the
typical case which reaches a final court of appeal. As we saw in
Barbara Jarvis, the language used in a statute will not clearly tell the
judges what the legislature has prescribed for the issue at the heart of the
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appeal. That ingredient of the legal system will be firmly settled for the
first time by the opinion of the court adjudicating the immediate
lawsuit.
Since this is the inescapable responsibility of the judicial role, we shall
naturally prefer a style of legal reasoning which appraises the fitness of
the rules that are available and anticipates the policy results of the one
that is selected. Only in this way can the judicial contribution to the law
that governs us exhibit decent workmanship. Yet we rightly deplore too
free-wheeling a stance in our judges. Even a final court should not have
complete discretion to look at any policy factors its members consider
relevant or take the law in any direction they believe desirable. A
detached view of the judicial institution raises some qualms about the
wisdom, the coherence, and the popular acceptability of judge-made
law. Judicial creativity is a necessity and can be a virtue, but it must
have its limits. Can we say anything useful about where these
boundaries are located?
There is a legal instrument which summarizes and integrates the thrust
of these many factors lurking in the background of any judicial
decision. This indispensable weapon in the judicial armoury is the legal
principle. A principle is a very different kind of legal doctrine than a
rule. A rule is applied directly to a fact situation in order to prescribe a
specific legal result. A principle is an argument which is appealed to as
a justification for the adoption of such a legal rule in the trouble case
where this is necessary (p. 49).
Weiler then goes on to give an example of the point he is making,
and it is a major strength of this book that the author has chosen to
use particular areas of the law and particular decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada to explain his criticism of the Court's
dominant reasoning style and to elucidate the style he is advocating.
This preliminary assessment of Weiler's study is intended to
persuade potential readers of the book's value in disposing of less
productive lines of debate and providing a foundation for
constructive dialogue about the Canadian legal system and its
future. I would urge its use as background reading for weekend
seminars of mixed groups of judges, practitioners and academics.
The preface tells us that "This is an essay in legal philosophy, an
attempt to develop a theory of the role of law in courts, which can
be used to appraise the legal reasoning and decisions of the Supreme
Court." There are three Parts. Part I devotes fifty pages to general
analysis of the Court as an institution and of the nature of the
appellate function of a nation's highest court. This is where the
author sets out his "theory of the role of law in courts", and he does
it well. The following excerpts indicate the quality of writing and
suggest a strong influence of the writings of Mr. Justice Cardozo.
7
7. If Canadian legal education had, from the start, put less emphasis on case law
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The judge will not find the solution in the bare words of the statute
book, no matter how long he stares at the page or how many dictionaries
he may consult; the answer is not there. This does not mean that a court
is lost in a sea of legal uncertainty. Judges simply must recognize that
there is more to a legal rule than its linguistic expression. Every legal
rule has a hidden dimension, an underlying structure. The rule
prescribes a standard of conduct in order to achieve some social
objective within an over-all statutory scheme. The aims of the
legislature have an equal claim on the title "law" as do the words
chosen to express this aim. The reasons why a judge is supposed to
respect the language of a legal rule equally demand fidelity to its
purpose. As the passage of time throws up marginal and unanticipated
cases to an appellate court, faithful interpretation of the rule requires
that the judges discern this hidden reality of legal policy and draw out its
implications for the case at hand (p. 35).
In sum, if an internal logic is visible in the existing structure of the law,
the legal community should be able to sense, at least within a reasonable
margin, the scope for judicial creativity in the immediate future. In fact,
I believe that legal argument in terms of principle is not only a necessary
avenue towards a better quality of legal justice, it is the primary source
of the stability and predictability of a legal order (p. 53).
Part II fills most of the book, containing 168 pages and five
chapters on the Supreme Court's decision-making in various areas
of the law: tort, criminal law, administrative law, federal division of
powers and civil liberties. In most, if not all, cases, these chapters
are based on articles which appeared earlier in legal periodicals and
will be familiar to regular readers of the Toronto-based journals.
Despite my admiration for Weiler's general theory and clarity of
reasoning I believe that his conclusions about the Canadian
Constitution and the r6le of the judiciary suffer from two defects.
The first is the inevitable superficiality that arises from trying to
deal with many major areas of law and the resulting failure to
appreciate fully some of the undercurrents in such complex areas as
constitutional and administrative law. The second defect flows from
a view that Canadian constitutional law is simply English
constitutional law with the federal division of powers tacked on, and
from the resulting over-emphasis on the doctrine of legislative
supremacy. Weiler appears unwilling to acknowledge the separation
of powers entrenched in the British North America Act, 1867, a
legal fact clearly documented and expounded by Lederman in his
and doctrinal analysis, and more on works of legal philosophy such as Cardozo's
classic essays in The Nature of the Judicial Process, The Paradoxes of Legal
Science, and The Growth of the Law, much of the criticism made by Weiler would
be unnecessary today.
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classic article, The Independence of the Judiciary8 (the starting
point in the education of Canadian constitutional lawyers), and now
established in Commonwealth constitutional law by the Privy
Council decision in Liyanage v. The Queen. 9
My disagreement with Professor Weiler as to the relative
importance in our constitutional law of the democratic principle of
legislative supremacy and the rule-of-law principle of separation of
powers leads to inevitable differences on the rrle of the judiciary in
interpreting the federal division of legislative power, reviewing
administrative action, and administering the Canadian Bill of
Rights. I should add, however, that I believe these differences can
be resolved within the theoretical framework provided in Part I of
the book.
I have no quarrel with the urging of greater resort to principle by
the Supreme Court in tort cases and criminal appeals, and I find
convincing the analysis of particular problem areas in terms of the
principles and social interests that the Supreme Court is in fact
dealing with when it decides such matters. The author's view of the
Supreme Court's responsibility in these areas is clearly stated in the
final paragraph of the chapter on criminal law:
Fidelity to law is an important value but it is not absolute. Judges who
have made and are continuing to make our law must be equally
concerned with the fairness and wisdom of the legal doctrines they are
using. A legal principle such as mens rea in criminal law, or negligence
in tort law, is the vehicle through which the resources of the judicial
process can be brought to bear for the incremental refinement of the
whole area of law. As stated earlier, there are limitations on the
wisdom, legitimacy, and effectiveness of judicial law reform. If a court
justifies its innovations by reference to established principles, it will
respect these limits. However, there are institutional reasons why the
courts are often the only, and sometimes even the best, source of
necessary legal reforms from within our governmental structure. Only a
court that is ready to overturn outmoded legal rules which can now be
seen to be irrational anomalies in the general thrust of the law (and the
case of Fleming v. Atkinson is a beautiful example), will fulfill this
indispensable role in securing a just and coherent legal system (p. 118).
Weiler's approach to administrative law is that of an experienced
labour arbitrator who sees judicial review largely as unwarranted
interference with important social purposes which the legislature
has deliberately entrusted to administrative agencies. While I agree
that the courts have often gone too far and have failed to articulate a
8. (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 769, 1139.
9. Footnote 5, supra.
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credible theory of judicial review, I do not share the author's faith
that our civil rights can be adequately secured if the power exercised
by labour boards and other agencies is put beyond judicial review. 10
Governments everywhere are coming to regard legal restraints on
their power as technical obstacles standing in the way of their grand
schemes. Only a vigorous exercise of judicial review power can
prevent this trend from becoming official contempt for the law and
the courts. James Bay may provide the ultimate test of judicial
resolve.
Weiler urges judicial restraint out of deference to the greater
sensitivity of labour boards to the problems and purposes the
legislature has sought to provide for. In so doing, he bases his
position entirely on the will of the legislature, thus failing to balance
this with the competing interest in legality, or the rule of law, which
is constitutionally inspired and therefore of the same order of
importance as the legislative will. This interest requires that labour
board autonomy be contained within the limits of the power
delegated to it, and since that power is delegated by statute,
definition of its limits is a matter for courts of law manned by an
independent judiciary. If the Supreme Court would only recognize
the constitutional basis of its authority to review administrative
action, it could then engage in a conscious process of balancing
these competing interests. Thus, the problem here is not one of
judicial restraint versus activism but rather one of clarifying the
constitutional values in issue and the legal policies through which
the courts ought to seek an appropriate balance between competing
values.
In his chapter on the Supreme Court as umpire of Canadian
federalism, Weiler chooses one of the most difficult areas in terms
of justiciability - marketing regulation - to make the point that
what passes for legal interpretation in this area is often little more
than judicial application of social, economic and political
considerations. However, the difficulty of developing and applying
legal principles to guide the ongoing interpretation of sections 91
and 92 of the British North America Act does not lead necessarily to
10. The new Labour Code of British Columbia Act, S.B.C. 1973 2nd. sess., c.
122, attempts to put the B.C. Labour Relations Board beyond the supervision of the
superior courts on any ground, including jurisdiction and ultra vires. The inevitable
challenge to the privative enactments in the Code will provide an interesting case
which will test the Supreme Court's sense of the constitutional origin of its ultimate
review power over ultra vires administrative action.
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the conclusion that the powers of the respective legislatures be
resolved by bargaining and compromise between governments. The
author does not suggest eliminating the courts entirely, but does
urge that diplomacy become the "primary vehicle for such
adjustment". He also suggests that the courts should be spared the
burden of decision in cases like the Manitoba Egg Reference. 11
Certainly the chicken-and-egg war left the Court slightly
shell-shocked, but we can hope that the experience will have taught
governments the constitutional dangers of using reference powers
for political purposes. The experience need not be repeated, and the
Court can continue to perform the vital task of laying down the
general guidelines and identifying the major areas of federal and
provincial power, without which federal-provincial negotiations
would operate in a legal vacuum, responding only to power.
I suspect the difference between Weiler and myself goes to the
appropriate balance of emphasis on the processes of political
bargaining and legal interpretation in applying the federal division
of legislative powers. Weiler's analysis of the problems of legal
interpretation are perceptive and should be helpful in the search for
greater objectivity and rationality in this process.
In his chapter on the Supreme Court as defender of our civil
liberties Weiler rightly warns of the dangers of too much judicial
activism in the application of vague terms like "equality before the
law" and "due process of law." However, I find his constitutional
theory confused. Referring to the Drybones case, 12 he states:
"When the court struck the provision [Indian Act, S. 94] down, it
overrode the wishes of an elected body." This is a statement of
philosophic preference rather than legal fact, for if the majority in
Drybones correctly read the intention of Parliament as expressed in
the Bill of Rights then it gave effect to the wishes of the elected
body. It was Parliament, not the Court, that condemned the
provision in question to limbo, the same Parliament which could, by
adding a non obstante clause, bring it back from limbo.
I suggest that Weiler is too charitable, and that the courts have
often ignored or frustrated the will of Parliament through
unwillingness to continue the development, in the cases, of
fundamental constitutional principles that was begun by Mr. Justice
11. The Attorney-General for Manitoba v. The Manitoba Egg and Poultry
Association, [1971] SCR 689.
12. [1970]SCR 282.
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Rand. I suggest further that the vagueness of terms found in the Bill
of Rights is partly in the eye of the beholder. If Parliament were to
use the expressions "equality before the law" and "due process of
law" in its next amendment of the Income Tax Act or Canada
Corporations Act, I doubt if it would require more than six months
for the courts to be provided with a wealth of authority, drawn from
our Anglo-Canadian legal heritage, to guide them in giving concrete
meaning to these phrases in particular cases.
I think Weiler is right when he asserts that "The decision in
Drybones can be of profound importance in the evolution of
Canadian law and courts . . . . because of its potential for the
substratum of legal reasoning in our courts." In determining the
extent of judicial responsibility under the Bill of Rights and how to
discharge it, the Supreme Court will have to go beyond doctrinal
analysis to a systematic consideration of legal theory. In fairness to
the Court, Parliament must end the right of appeal in civil cases on a
monetary basis to make this possible. Weiler's analysis, which
draws on the best of English and American legal scholarship and
applies the resulting theory to the unique constitutional arrange-
ments of Canada, could be very useful to the judges.
When Parliament recites, in the preamble to the Bill of Rights, its
desire that the Bill "shall ensure the protection of these rights and
freedoms in Canada," then goes on to declare the right to liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except by due process of law, further specifies the right of a person
detained to retain and instruct counsel without delay, and enacts that
every law of Canada (including the law as to admissibility of
evidence) shall be so applied as not to authorize the infringement of
those rights, it seems clear that the courts, however unwise they
may consider this policy, are being told by the legislative branch to
withhold judicial sanction from executive action done in deliberate
violation of the right to legal counsel. When, in the face of all this,
the Supreme Court asserts, as the majority have just done in Hogan
v. The Queen, 13 that the common law prevails to allow in evidence
obtained through deliberate disobedience to an Act of Parliament,
we can only assume great confusion concerning the r6le of the
Supreme Court and the place of civil liberties in constitutional
theory and jurisprudence.
13. Judgment pronounced June 12, 1974.
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Weiler examines the Supreme Court decisions in Drybones,
Wray, 14 and Osborne,i15 and concludes that the risk of judicial
decisions that are "both unwise and irreversible" outweighs the
desirability in principle of judicial review.' 6 If Weiler is not here
advocating repeal of the Canadian Bill of Rights, then he is urging
that the Supreme Court render it a dead letter by giving it little or no
effect in law. Given that the Bill of Rights is law, and is now
contained in the Appendix to the Revised Statutes of Canada along
with constitutional documents, I regard the latter course of action as
a dangerous subversion of the authority of the elected legislature.
Chief Justice Laskin, dissenting in the Burnshine case, 17 has
demonstrated an approach to the Bill of Rights that is responsive to
the legislative intent while avoiding the Drybones result of holding
federal enactments inoperative. There is an interesting precedent for
this approach in the dissenting judgment of Cartwright, J. in
Klippert v. The Queen, 18 where the Interpretation Act was invoked
as authority for an interpretation of the law on dangerous sexual
offenders that avoided a serious abrogation of the liberty of the
subject.
While I find Weiler's analysis stimulating and persuasive, I
disagree with him here, and would urge that the Supreme Court
adopt a pragmatic approach to the Bill of Rights as simply an
additional source of authority for protecting basic rights and
freedoms, regard Drybones as an exceptional and dramatic
application of the Bill, and take a more positive approach to the Bill
as a tool for protecting citizens from executive and administrative
power. The dissent in Burnshine shows how this can be done in a
way that balances judicial responsibility under the Bill of Rights
with legislative supremacy under the Constitution.
Another Drybones or two might arise, but the value of this
approach is that the judicial responsibility would be directed, as it
should be, largely at the exercise of executive and administrative
power, leaving it to Parliament to ensure that federal laws are such
as to be capable of construction and application in a manner that
does not violate basic rights and freedoms,
14. Regina v. Wray [1971]SCR 272.
15. Regina v. Osborne [ 1971] SCR 184.
16. Pages 221-2.
17. Regina v. Burnshine [1974144 DLR (3d) 584.
18. [1967] SCR 822.
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In Part III, a brief chapter on the future of the Supreme Court,
Weiler demonstrates an awareness of the complexity of the judicial
process and the risks inhererlt in judicial reform of the law. He
clearly intends the book more as a mind-expanding experience than
as a debating brief. It deserves to be judged and used accordingly.
The flavour of the book can be well sampled from the following
passage on the role of principle in the legal reasoning of a nation's
highest court:
Now the point of legal principles can be seen. Judges must develop and
settle the law in the light of the policies believed appropriate for that
area. However, these value judgments need not simply reflect the
personal attitudes of the judges who happen to sit on that appeal panel.
Instead, the court should be able to discern a series of policy judgments
already embodied in existing legal standards. The judges must articulate
a theory which explains how these many judgments form a systematic
whole, a theory which is summarized in the legal principle. The
principle expresses the theme by which a society has gradually resolved
the competing interests and values which are the common strands of this
area of life. Once such a theory is articulated, it may become the
fundamental reality of the law which governs the judges. If a new
question arises, a court can and should appeal to this principle to justify
its new legal rule. If one of the existing rules seems incompatible with
the thrust of the law's evolution that same principled argument will




The Judge in a Communist State: A View From Within.
By Otto U16. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1972. Pp. xiv,
307. Price: $8.75.
Professor Ul, a reluctant recruit to the Czechoslovak bench at age
twenty-three, has penned an anecdotal memoir of his six;year
judicial career from 1953-1959. It is an intimate, candid, and often
unflattering behind-the-scenes account which he contends was
typical of the other European people's democracies of the period.
Ulc chose this approach because, he said, he wished to focus on
"individuals" rather than "legal formulae" (p. ix). He abandoned
his original intention of undertaking a project similar to one
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conceived by Professor Harold J. Berman two decades earlier.
(Berman had persuaded Professor B. A. Konstantinovsky, who
practised and taught law in Odessa before the Second World War, to
recollect cases in which he was involved. A selection of these
published in 1953 was illustrative of the extent to which a viable
legal system functioned side by side with a regime of coercion in
Stalinist Russia.) 1
Although some of Ul's remarks are illuminating in this
connection, on the whole his contribution to the law-in-action
literature offers the comparatist far less than a systematic
data-oriented approach that would enable one to test generalizations
in Konstantinovsky or some of the useful empirical studies
emanating from the socialist countries in recent years. For example,
a Polish study of people's assessors (lay judges) has shown that
contrary to popular belief in Poland the assessors have an explicit
influence on court judgments in 40% of the cases, although 46% of
the Polish judges questioned in the project believed that the
assessors had no influence whatever.2 U16 depicts the assessor as
having virtually no influence in Czechoslovakia during his years on
the bench and maintains that he and many other judges manipulated
the assignment of assessors to cases for that purpose (a practice also
reported in Poland). Different periods? Different countries?
Incompatible samples? Reconcilable data? Who can say?
W. E. Butler
Reader in Comparative Law
University of London
1. See B. A. Konstantinovsky, Soviet Law in Action: The Recollected Cases of a
Soviet Lawyer (ed. H. J. Berman). Cambridge, Mass., 1953.
2. S. Zawadzki and L. Kubicki (eds.), Udzial lawnikow w postepowaniu kamym.
Opinie a rzeczywistosc. Studium prawnoempiryczne. Warsaw, 1970. (English
summary). Abbreviated accounts of this study have appeared in several places,
including: "Lay Assessor Judges in Penal Proceedings," 1969 Polish Round Table
97-111; Zawadzki and Kubicki, "L'Element populaire et le juge professionnel
dans la procedure plnale en Pologne," Droit polonais contemporain, no. 17/18
(1972), pp. 31-42. Also see M. Rybicki, "La participation des citoyens a
l'administration de la justice en Pologne et dans les pays socialistes," 23 Revue
internationale de droit compari 553-565 (1971). For a recent Soviet inquiry into
the professional qualifications of people's judges, see N. V. Radutnaia, "Kriterii
professional'noi podgotovlennosti sudei," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo no. 1
(1974), pp. 96-102. On Hungarian experience, see A. Racz, "People's Assessors
in European Socialist Countries," 14 Acta Juridica 395-413 (1972).
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Ontario Labour Relations Board Practice. By Jeffrey Sack and
Martin Levinson. Toronto: Butterworth and Company (Canada)
Ltd., 1973. Pp. xviii, 549. Price: $15.00 (paperback).
For the practitioner of labour law the substantive and procedural
doctrine developed by the labour relations board in his jurisdiction
is perhaps the main body of relevant law. The rulings of arbitrators
are of great practical importance and the decisions of the courts
deserve special attention because both arbitrators and labour
relations boards must bow to them. It is, however, the practice of
the labour relations boards, charged with the certification of unions
and the protection of employees', unions' and employers' rights,
that puts the most important gloss on the labour relations legislation
in each jurisdiction in Canada.
Of the eleven labour boards in Canada the Ontario Labour
Relations Board is the most important, not only because Ontario is
the largest and most heavily industrialized province, but also
because the Ontario Board has administered its legislation
rationally, developing a coherent and responsive Board jurispru-
dence. It alone among Canadian labour relations boards has, since
its creation in 1944, consistently published reasons for its decisions.
However, the mode of publication has left a lot to be desired, and
for that reason alone the carefully ordered and comprehensive
compilation of Ontario Board decisions in Ontario Labour
Relations Board Practice by Sack and Levinson will be of great use
to practitioners, particularly those new to the field, and to
researchers and students.
The approach is functional. Except in the first chapter and the
closing two chapters the issues are dealt with in order as they might
arise in proceedings before the Board. Three parts of the first
chapter are devoted to the history of the Board and the Ontario
Labour Relations Act, a general comment on the scheme, purpose
and powers of the Board under the Act and its make-up, including
the names of members. The other part of chapter one deals with the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Board. The authors set out
straightforwardly and succinctly, with footnote references to any
relevant Board rulings and court decisions, the substantive and
procedural rules which might concern a practitioner faced with that
issue before the Ontario Labour Relations Board. There is no
reference to secondary sources in any of the footnotes. The same
approach is followed throughout the rest of the book.
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Chapter two deals with the sometimes difficult question of
'persons to whom the Act applies" and therefore cuts across all the
various proceedings before the Board. Chapter three deals with
"Certification" and takes, quite appropriately, over one third the
total number of pages in the text. The next six chapters are each
devoted to a particular type of proceeding before the Ontario Board.
Chapter ten deals with minor proceedings which do not merit a
chapter to themselves and chapter eleven is entitled "Matters of
Practice of General Application'', which means that its practical
importance is considerable. In chapter twelve the authors depart
from their functional method of taking matters of procedure and
substance as they would arise in proceedings before the Board to
consider the law relating to judicial review of Board decisions.
Finally, there is a "Supplement on the Construction Industry", in
which Board practice and decisions relating to the construction
industry part of the Ontario Labour Relations Act are noted.
Each chapter is divided by a good number of subheads, although
only the major headings within a chapter appear in the Table of
Contents. This gives quite generous guidance to one seeking
references. There is also a reasonably full index and a "Table of
Cases Dealt with in the Courts" at the back of the book.
Nevertheless, since the greatest use for Ontario Labour Relations
Board Practice will be as a reference text, the inclusion of a more
fully analytical Table of Contents, in which all sub-heads appeared,
might have been wise. The usefulness of the book might also have
been improved by greater cross-referencing through footnotes.
Ontario Labour Relations Board Practice is intended to be a
practitioner's text. The authors, therefore, may be assumed to aspire
to accuracy, completeness of coverage combined with business-like
conciseness, and ease of use for reference purposes. Each of these
good qualities they have achieved in more than ample measure, and
in spite of the technicality of the material and the mass of detail the
text is consistently readable because it is well written. But the best
legal texts manage, without sacrificing these aims, to lay bare for
their readers the unifying themes of the subject, to criticize, to
speculate and to press for improvement in the law. At the start of
each chapter Sack and Levinson do state, concisely, the thrust of the
Board's treatment of the subject matter of the chapter, but apart
from that these creative functions are really never attempted.
Within the uncritical framework the authors have set for
themselves their treatment of Ontario Board practice could have
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been more satisfactory in two respects. First, there could be more
generalizations, more pulling together of the Board decisions which
are so voluminously footnoted. Trends in Board jurisprudence, both
general and in relation to particular issues such as employer
interference in the selection of bargaining agents, might have been
identified. Second, the authors could have infused the text with
more of their understanding of how the law applies in fact. For
example, it is surely very useful in discussing successor rights upon
the sale of a business [p. 195] to explain briefly, as they do, the
circumstances under which the determination of such rights reaches
the Labour Relations Board. But then, just a few pages later they
note that the section empowering the Board to deal with successor
rights "does not include the contracting out of work" but "does
include the sale of part of a business" without any discussion of the
difficulties that this distinction may give rise to in practice.
Sack and Levinson are active practitioners on the labour side and
it is perhaps for this reason that they are careful to do no more than
state the law directly as it comes from Board rulings, judicial
decisions and legislation. It may be unfortunate that they have
avoided all critical comment or suggestions for change, but the
result undoubtedly is that they have provided no basis whatever
upon which the accuracy of their text can be attacked.
In spite of their value-free stance, the authors have in one respect
taken a most welcome approach to administrative law. They have
concentrated on what the administrative tribunal with which they
are dealing has itself said, rather than upon what the courts have said
about it. Apart from a very brief statement on judicial review in
chapter twelve, they have concentrated on weaving the major
judicial pronouncements affecting the Ontario Labour Relations
Board into the fabric of the Board practice within the subject area of
each chapter.
The heavy caseload of the Ontario Board means that inevitably
that Board has dealt with many matters upon which other labour
relations boards, particularly in the small provinces, have never had
occasion to rule. Moreover, what rulings there have been in other
provinces may not have been systematically published or reasons
may not have been given. Practitioners outside as well as in Ontario
will therefore find in Ontario Labour Relations Board Practice a
useful framework of decisions within which labour law problems
can be tackled. They must bear in mind, of course, that there are a
great many differences between the labour relations legislation of
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Ontario and other provinces, and that even where the legislation is
similar Ontario Board policy may not be adopted by the boards of
other provinces. That is to say that while this new text will be a
considerable aid to the careful lawyer outside of Ontario, it may be
something of a trap for the careless one.
The personnel of the Ontario Labour Relations Board has
undergone a dramatic change since this book went to press. There
are rumblings which indicate that there may also be changes in the
policies and practices of the Board and perhaps amendments to the
Ontario Labour Relations Act and the Regulations under it. Even
so, Sack and Levinson have done an excellent service in bringing
together the Ontario legislation, judicial pronouncments and, most
important, the Board's own rulings on its practice. The Board's
Monthly Reports and the recently implemented Butterworth's
series, which will report the decisions of labour boards across the
country, are available to anyone who wishes to keep up to date.
In its hard-cover edition Ontario Labour Relations Board
Practice has been padded with five statutory appendices: Sections
91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act, the Statutory Powers Procedure Act,
1971, and the Judicial Review Procedure Act, 1971 of Ontario, as
well as the whole of the Ontario Labour Relations Act and the Rules
of Practice, Regulations and Practice Notes of the Board. This
material, which can be obtained elsewhere free, or virtually so,
constitutes in all 227 pages out of the total of 570 pages in the book.
Butterworth is not alone among Canadian law book publishers in
including a mass of public documentary material between the covers
of an expensive law book, but that does not excuse the practice. It is
particularly objectionable where the result is a negative first
impression of what is, in fact, a very fine book. Happily, the soft
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The New Law of the Sea. By Karin Hjertonsson. Leiden: Sijthoff.
1973. Pp. 187. Price: Dfl. 33.00
The Law of International Spaces. By John Kish. Leiden: Sijthoff.
1973. Pp. xi, 236. Price: Dfl. 300.00.
The Third U.N. Conference on the law of the sea has drawn
attention not only to the complexity of current problems in the law
of the sea, but also to the special role of the Latin American
countries in developing the "new law of the sea". It will be recalled
that it was Argentina that first claimed sovereignty over an
extensive continental shelf and that it was the Central and Latin
American states that first put forward a claim to a 200-mile
territorial belt. Dr. Hjertonsson's New Law of the Sea is especially
concerned with Latin American contributions to the emerging
consensus on extension of coastal jurisdiction, which has proved to
be one of the central features of the Conference.
The author points out that the Latin American countries - and
this is true of others too - are not specific in the language they
employ to describe their claims, but she rightly states that "the
important element, for the purpose of analysis, is the purpose
behind each act of legislation" [p. 46]. "From a pragmatic view
point, a coastal state's use of its adjacent sea and sea-bed consists of
various functions. Such functions include, for example, fishing,
extraction of minerals and other resources from the sea-bed and
subsoid, security, enforcement of neutrality, control of navigation
and protection for sanitary, fiscal and customs purposes. If all
possible imaginable functions a state could assert in this area were
bundled together, the area would be under total control of the
coastal state and the jurisdiction would equal the jurisdiction the
state asserts over its land territory - in other words, sovereignty"
[p. 76]. However, states often are only desirous of claiming some of
these functions, in which case "the concept of the territorial sea
based on sovereignty is not adequate. The result is that states, in
order to pursue their national interests, either make excessive claims
to territorial seas when they are only interested in controlling certain
functions, or they create new concepts of the law of the sea to apply
to these particular functions" [p. 77]. The Canadian attitude
towards pollution control which has gradually been adopted by a
large number of other littoral states is a good example of this.
In the author's opinion - and this may be tested at Caracas
the territorial sea, viewed by most Latin Americans as merging with
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the "patrimonial sea", may come to be fixed at twelve miles, while
many jurisdictional functions will be exercised to much further
distances. In the author's words "we can realistically conclude that
customary international law on coastal jurisdiction is unambigu-
ously moving in the direction of wider coastal jurisdiction over
resources in adjacent sea and sea-bed. Many states have accepted or
are likely to soon accept the Latin American position, perhaps in a
modified form but in substance the same, expressing the right to
economic resources beyond the territorial sea" [p. 116]. The author
describes what has taken place as "a good example of the
phenomenon of creeping jurisdiction. The study of the evolution of
the law of the sea in Latin America has made it clear that developing
coastal states group together in common interest and in a common
feeling of solidarity against the developed world, and by their large
number dominate the law-making process and codification of the
law of the sea within the framework of the United Nations"
[p. 177]. This factor became apparent in the early days of the
Caracas Conference with regard to the voting procedure but is by no
means confined to law of the sea issues.
While pressure has been accumulating in the evolving new sea
law, there has been an increasing awareness of other extra-territorial
areas in which states may have a real or imagined interest,
frequently leading them to assert sovereign rights or claims which
are confined to specific jurisdictional interests. The areas in which
such claims have developed have been broadly described as
"space". In his Ph.D. thesis entitled The Law of International
Spaces, Dr. Kish includes within this rubric the high seas, polar
regions and cosmic space. His monograph is concerned with
delimitation, prohibition of territorial sovereignty, jurisdiction of a
flag state, and the use of force in each of these international spaces.
There will probably be little argument with his statement that "the
law of international spaces requires the establishment of new
international institutions. The common legal regime of international
spaces manifests the necessity of adopting a multilateral treaty on
international spaces, establishing an organization for international
spaces, and agreeing on the adjudication of disputes concerning
international spaces. The international implementation of these
objectives would create viable legal institutions for international
spaces" [p. 3]. However, anybody who considers this to be an easy
task, or a practical programme, is sanguine in the extreme.
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In so far as delimitation of marine space is concerned, Dr. Kish
seems to support a twelve-mile limit, which would "eliminate the
present disadvantageous position of states insisting on the
three-mile limit, [while] such a regulation would preclude the
legality of any unilateral extension of the territorial sea beyond the
twelve-mile limit" [p. 15]. It is perhaps unfortunate that he does not
examine the problem of functional extension and adopts instead the
traditional view with regard to the limitation or exclusion of
sovereignty, accompanying this idea with a call for an international
regime over the whole of the high seas and regulating the public
order therein [p. 67].
As to the Arctic, Dr. Kish mentions that the United States, the
Soviet Union, Norway, Denmark and Canada all have arctic
territories, and he states simpliciter, that "Arctic lands are subject
to the sovereignty of the sector state" [p. 27], without examining
the reality of the sector principle. He goes on to say that the
territorial sovereignty of the sector state extends to the seabed and
subsoil, airspace of the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the
contiguous zone, while "all parts of the Arctic Ocean that are not
included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state,
form part of the high seas" [Pp. 27-8], but he gives no hint as to
where such high seas are, and when dealing with the prohibition of
sovereignty in this area, he bluntly states that "international law
recognizes the freedom of the Arctic Ocean . . . .[and] the practice
of states justifies the application of the law of the high seas to the
areas of the high seas of the Arctic Ocean" [p. 70], which is
tantamount to defining sovereignty as that which is enjoyed by a
sovereign. It is perhaps unfortunate that, in examining the problems
of the Arctic, Dr. Kish did not go into the same detail as he has done
with Antarctica, although in this connection he may feel that the
international status is more significant in view of the existence of
the Antarctica Treaty. To some extent his task with regard to
celestial objects is equally facilitated by the existence of the Outer
Space Treaty, although his idealistic approach to international
control breaks through in this connection too: "The delimitation of
outer space and celestial bodies requires a concrete international
regulation. While the lower orbit of spacecraft around celestial
bodies may be adopted as the governing rule of delimitation, the
actual height of this limit varies around each celestial body. The
establishment of such a boundary would secure the delimitation of
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the different international regimes of outer space and celestial
bodies" [p. 48].
Both books contain much material of interest and overlap to some
extent. Of the two, that by Dr. Hjertonsson on the New Law of the
Sea is perhaps the more practical, while Dr. Kish's survey of the
Law of International Spaces serves to remind us of the nebulous
state of the law where at least some of these are concerned, while at
the same time illustrating the distance between public order and
present realities.
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